

Latin-into-Hebrew: Texts and Studies

Volume Two: Texts in Contexts

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THE *QUAESTIO DE UNITATE UNIVERSALIS* TRANSLATED INTO HEBREW: VINCENT FERRER, PETRUS NIGRI AND 'ELI HABILLO— A TEXTUAL COMPARISON

Alexander Fidora and Mauro Zonta

1. INTRODUCTION

Until the end of the twentieth century, the complete and original Latin text of Vincent Ferrer's philosophico-theological work, usually known as the *De unitate universalis*, composed in Lleida in around 1370–1372, was thought to have been passed down on folios 237^r–241^v of a unique manuscript from Vienna, Dominikanerkonvent 49/271, dating back to the fifteenth century.

This text, discovered and first published by Pierre Henri Fages in 1909,¹ was re-published in a first critical edition by John A. Trentman in 1982.² Apparently, neither Fages nor Trentman noticed the fact that, only a century after its compilation, passages from Vincent Ferrer's work were cited by the German Dominican philosopher and theologian Petrus Nigri (Peter Schwarz) in his work *Clipeus thomistarum* (*Shield of the Thomists*), first published in Venice in 1481.³

In addition, in 1995, Mauro Zonta found—on folios 126^v–144^r of ms. Parma, Biblioteca Palatina, parmense 2631 (formerly De Rossi 457)—and briefly examined a Hebrew translation of a work ascribed to the Dominican friar named *Vincent*. The existence of this translation, made by an anonymous author, who should very probably be identified with the late

¹ *Œuvres de Saint Vincent Ferrer*, 2 vols., ed. Pierre Henri Fages (Paris: Picard, 1909–1911), here vol. I.

² Vincent Ferrer, "The *Quaestio de unitate universalis* of Vincent Ferrer", ed. John A. Trentman, *Mediaeval Studies* 44 (1982): 122–137.

³ Petrus Nigri. *Clipeus thomistarum* (Venetiis: Apud Raynaldum de Novimagio, 1481, reprinted 1967: Frankfurt am Main: Minerva).

fifteenth-century Aragonese Jewish philosopher ‘Eli Habillo,⁴ had first been discovered by Moritz Steinschneider in 1893. Steinschneider ascribed the work to the famous thirteenth-century French Dominican friar Vincent of Beauvais,⁵ not noticing that the title of the Hebrew translation of the work, *Ma’amar nikhbad ba-kolel*, i.e. “honourable discourse concerning the universal”, was almost identical—as first pointed out by Zonta—to that given to the Latin text of the *Quaestio de unitate universalis* by another Dominican friar, namely, Vincent Ferrer.⁶

Alexander Fidora and Mauro Zonta have recently re-edited the *Quaestio de unitate universalis* together with the *Ma’amar nikhbad ba-kolel*.⁷ At first glance, the Hebrew text in the Parma manuscript does not agree with that of the Latin text preserved in the Vienna manuscript, since the former contains large sections which are absent from the latter. However, there is at least one citation in the *Clipeus thomistarum* which makes reference to these sections of the Hebrew version which are otherwise lost in Latin.⁸ In fact, a more detailed examination shows that the *Quaestio de unitate universalis* and the Hebrew version are partially identical, leading to the hypothesis that the Hebrew translation of the Latin text may represent a more complete redaction of Vincent Ferrer’s work which is now lost.

The differences and coincidences in structure and content between all three testimonies, namely the Latin text as transmitted by the Vienna manuscript, the *Clipeus thomistarum* by Petrus Nigri and the Hebrew translation, can be summarized as in Table I, which also shows that the texts are arranged in a different sequence with varying numeration of the arguments. On the following pages, we offer a transcription and detailed philological analysis of those arguments which are available in all three witnesses. Thus, we shall present and discuss 1) the extreme realist arguments in favour of

⁴ In fact, the Parma manuscript contains a great number of translations by ‘Eli Habillo. It also includes the philosophical correspondence between the Jewish translator Abraham Bibago and Moses Arondi which was seemingly forwarded to Habillo.

⁵ See Moritz Steinschneider, *Die hebraeischen Übersetzungen des Mittelalters und die Juden als Dolmetscher* (Berlin: Kommissionsverlag des Bibliographischen Bureaus, 1893), 489.

⁶ Cf. Mauro Zonta, “The Original Text of Vincent Ferrer’s *Tractatus de unitate universalis* Discovered in an Unknown Hebrew Translation?”, *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 39 (2006): 147–151.

⁷ Vincent Ferrer, *Quaestio de unitate universalis*—מאמר נכבד בכולל (*Ma’amar nikhbad ba-kolel*), ed. Alexander Fidora, Mauro Zonta (Santa Coloma de Queralt: Obrador Edèndum/UAB/URV, 2010).

⁸ Namely the explanations concerning the “real universal”, cf. Table I. This passage has been analysed in detail by Zonta, “The Original Text of Vincent Ferrer’s *Tractatus de unitate universalis*”.

a real unity of the universal, 2) opposing arguments and 3) the respective refutations of the extreme realist arguments.

Table 1.

<i>Quaestio de unitate universalis</i> , paragraph numbers according to ed. Fidora/Zonta	<i>Clipeus thomistarum</i> , Venetiis: Apud Raynaldum de Novimagio, 1481	<i>Ma'amar nikhbad ba-kolel</i> , paragraph numbers according to ed. Fidora/Zonta
∅	∅	A "disputed question" on whether the universal does not exist outside the soul (§ 2–30). This question includes
∅	Explanations of the "real universal" are found here (ff. 70 ^{ra} and 70 ^{ra} –70 ^{rb}), which are not preserved in the Latin text, but which appear in the Hebrew. They are explicitly attributed to Vincent Ferrer.	an explanatory definition of the "real universal" (§ 10–14).
∅	∅	A "disputed question" on whether the universal exists in the soul (§ 32–45).
∅	∅	A "disputed question" on whether the universal is one with its individuals (§ 46–51).
A "disputed question" on whether the unity of the universal is real (§ 1–83). This question includes:	∅	A "disputed question" on whether the unity of the universal is real (§ 81–131). This question includes, among others:
a) twelve arguments in favour of the theory that the unity of the universal is real (§ 2–17);	The extreme realist arguments 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 of point a) of the Latin = arguments 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10 of point c) of the Hebrew (ff. 66 ^{rb} –va).	a) twelve arguments in favour of the theory that the unity of the universal is not real (§ 88–100); they correspond to those found in point b) of the Latin <i>Quaestio</i> ;

<i>Quaestio de unitate universalis</i> , paragraph numbers according to ed. Fidora/Zonta	<i>Clipeus thomistarum</i> , Venetiis: Apud Raynaldum de Novimagio, 1481	<i>Ma'amar nikhbad ba-kolel</i> , paragraph numbers according to ed. Fidora/Zonta
b) twelve opposing arguments, according to which the unity of the universal is not real (§18–49);	Opposing arguments 1, 9, 10 of point b) of the Latin and of point a) of the Hebrew (ff. 67 ^{rb} – ^{va} , 68 ^{ra} – ^{rb}).	b) two propositions about the fact that the unity of the universal is not real, but rational (§101); the corresponding arguments are found in point c) of the Latin <i>Quaestio</i> ;
c) solution of the question, affirming that the unity of the universal is not real, but rational (§50–56);	∅	c) thirteen arguments by means of which logicians contend that the unity of the universal is real (§105–117); they correspond to those found in point a) of the Latin <i>Quaestio</i> ;
d) a refutation of the above twelve arguments of point a) (§57–81).	The refutation of the above six arguments, also found in the Latin (d) and in the Hebrew (d), is given here (ff. 68 ^{vb} –69 ^{ra}).	d) a refutation of the above thirteen arguments (§118–131).
Conclusion: while the universal's nature is real, its unity is not (§82).	∅	Conclusion: the universal is one and exists in our soul only (§132–133).

2. TEXTS AND ANALYSIS

2.1. *The Extreme Realist Arguments in Favour of a Real Unity of the Universal*

1st Argument

Based on the following line of reasoning: One can have scientific knowledge solely of universals. But, if universals do not have a real unity, then the object of scientific knowledge is not real.

Latin text Ed. Fidora/Zonta, pp. 84/86	Petrus Nigri <i>Clipeus thomistarum</i> , fol. 66 ^{rb}
[2] Et arguitur quod sic. Si natura universalis non esset una realiter, sed realiter plurificaretur ad plurificationem suorum singularium, sequeretur quod de ea non potest esse scientia. Consequens est falsum, quia scientia est de universali et de naturis quibus convenit esse universalis.	Prima ratio. Si natura specifica non esset una realiter, sed realiter plurificaretur ad plurificationem suorum individuorum, tunc de ea non posset esse scientia. Consequens est impossibile. Igitur et antecedens.
[3] Probatur consequentia, quia individua sunt contingentia corruptibilium et transmutabilium de quibus non est scientia. Sed natura universalis, postquam plurificatur et multiplicatur ad multiplicationem eorum, ita desinit esse ad desinitionem eorum et transmutabitur ad transmutationem eorum, et per consequens erit contingens, corruptibilis et transmutabilis; quod est falsum, ut habetur primo <i>Posteriorum</i> , ubi dicit quod universale est aeternum et sempiternum. In libro <i>Topicorum</i> habetur quod scientia est eorum quae vere sunt suique substantiam impermutabilem sortiuntur. Ita ergo universale est unum realiter et habet universalitatem realem.	Consequentia probatur, quia si natura universalis non haberet unitatem propriam, sed plurificaretur ad plurificationem individuorum, tunc sicut ipsa individua sunt contingentia ac corruptibilia, ita et natura humana esset contingens et corruptibilis. Sed de contingentibus et corruptibilibus non est scientia, ut patet primo <i>Posteriorum</i> , igitur et caetera.

[105] הטענה הראשונה: אם לא יהיה לכולל אחדות עניני, אבל יהיה מתרבה בענין כפי התרבות החלקיים, אם כן אי אפשר שישתחלפו יחסים בטבע הכולל הוא עם היה הטבע הוא עניני. שם הה + ... + מהם האישים הם אפשריים ונפסדים. אם כן, אחר שהטבע הכולל יתרבה בהתרבותם, הנה גם הוא יהיה אפשרי ונפסד. אבל אי אפשר שתגיע לנו ידיעה באפשרי ולא בנפסד. וזה כי הידיעה היא בדברים האמיתיים אשר עצמיותם בלתי משתנה, כמו שהתבאר בספר המה שאחר הטבע—אבל זה שקר, ר"ל שלא התבאר שמה בכולל כמו שהתבאר בא' מספר המופת, כי הנה כל הידיעה היא בכולל; אם כן, וכו'. ועוד יתחייב שיהיה הכולל הוא העניני כמו האפשרי הם רבים; וזה כי הוא מתרבה תחת רבות האחדות—זה שקר, כי כמו שהתבאר בא' מספר המופת, הנה הכולל הוא מתמיד ונצחי.

Translation: [105] First argument: if the universal did not have a real unity, but instead were really pluralised in line with the plurality of its particulars, it would be impossible for relationships within the nature of that universal to be changeable, since that universal would be real. Thus, †...† their individuals are things both possible and corruptible. If such is the case, given that universal nature is multiplied in keeping with the multiplication of its individuals, that nature is likewise both possible and corruptible. But we cannot have

(scientific) knowledge of that which is possible yet not have it of that which is corruptible, since such knowledge concerns true things whose essence is not subject to change, as is proved in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. This, however, is false, since this assertion is not proved there in a universal manner as is done in the first book of the *Posterior Analytics*; in fact, if it were proved, the entire science would be universal. Therefore, that real universal, being possible, would be many, since it would be multiplied into many unities. This is false, however, since, as has been proved in the first book of the *Posterior Analytics*, the universal is always eternal.

An examination of the general structure and the contents of the Hebrew translation of this passage suggests that it substantially agrees with the Latin text of the Vienna ms., but includes some alterations with respect to it; these alterations are, for the most part, in agreement with the implicit, non-literal citation by Petrus Nigri. On some points, the three versions evidently differ: in these cases, there is no reason to exclude the possibility that the Hebrew version is the most faithful one with respect to the lost original text, although it seems to have introduced some variant readings and short alterations.

In order to show the substantial, but not total, agreement between the Hebrew translation and the Latin text of the Vienna ms., the contents of the latter can be compared to the contents of the former as follows.

- The beginning of paragraph 2 of the Latin text of the Vienna ms., “si natura universalis non esset una realiter, sed realiter plurificaretur ad plurificationem suorum singularium”, almost literally corresponds to the beginning of the Hebrew translation: “If the universal did not have a real unity, but instead were really pluralised in line with the plurality of its particulars”.
- However, the following part of this paragraph (from “sequeretur quod de ea non potest esse scientia ...” until “... et de naturis quibus convenit esse universalis”) is totally absent from the Hebrew translation.
- The first lines of paragraph 3 of the Latin text (“Probatur consequentia, quia individua sunt contingentia corruptibilium et transmutabilium de quibus non est scientia. Sed natura universalis, postquam plurificatur et multiplicatur ad multiplicationem eorum”) correspond to the continuation of the Hebrew: “Their individuals are things both possible and corruptible. If such is the case, given that universal nature is multiplied in keeping with the multiplication of its individuals”.
- The following sentence, as found in the Latin text of the Vienna ms. (“ita desinit esse ad desinitionem eorum et transmutabitur ad transmutationem eorum”) has no correspondence in Hebrew. This fact

- might be due to a *saut-du-même-au-même*, i.e. a homeoteleuton, made by ‘Eli Habillo in reading the Latin text.
- The Latin sentence “et per consequens erit contingens, corruptibilis, et transmutabilis”, as found in the Vienna ms., substantially corresponds to the following passage of the Hebrew text: “that nature is likewise both possible and corruptible”.
 - Also the sentence “quod est falsum, ut habetur primo *Posteriorum*, ubi dicit quod universale est aeternum et sempiternum” closely corresponds to the final sentence of the Hebrew translation: “This is false, however, since, as has been proved in the first book of the *Posterior Analytics*, the universal is always eternal”.
 - The following sentence of the Vienna ms. (“In libro *Topicorum* habetur quod scientia est eorum quae vere sunt suique substantiam impermutabilem sortiuntur”), which is put almost at the end of paragraph 3, corresponds substantially to a passage in the middle of the same paragraph as it is found in Hebrew: “Such knowledge concerns true things whose essence is not subject to change, as is proved in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*”. The same passage appears in a different place in the Latin and in the Hebrew, but it seems that the Hebrew text is more correct here: as a matter of fact, the Latin text suggests that this passage is found in Aristotle’s *Topics*, where no apparent reference to this concept is found; in contrast, the Hebrew translation refers to the *Metaphysics* instead, where, in book I (Alpha maior), there is a treatment of “knowledge” and its subjects, and a reference to such “unchangeable” things like the ideal Platonic forms is found in chapter 6.
 - The final passage of the Latin text of the Vienna ms. (“Ita ergo universale est unum realiter et habet universalitatem realem”) has no correspondence neither in Petrus Nigri’s citation nor in the Hebrew translation. This passage might be an interpolation made by the Latin ‘reviser’ of the text as found in the Vienna ms.

With our last remark, we have pointed to the correspondence between the Hebrew translation and the Latin text as found in Petrus Nigri, insofar as they both omit the same passage; as we shall see, this is not a unique occurrence. Thus, Petrus Nigri’s citations and the Hebrew translation agree on several points as against the Latin text in the Vienna ms.

- In the Vienna ms., the above argument is introduced with the formula “Et arguitur quod sic”, which corresponds to the usual formula for introducing a “debated question” (*quaestio disputata*) in Latin Scholasticism. In contrast, both Petrus Nigri and ‘Eli Habillo introduce the text

- as the first one in a series of arguments (“prima ratio”, i.e. “first argument”, as is found in the Hebrew).
- The references to the concept of “transmutation”, found in some passages of paragraph 3 of the Latin text of the Vienna ms., are absent from both Petrus Nigri’s citation and from the Hebrew translation. This absence might suggest that this concept was added by the author of the Latin reworking of the text as preserved in the Vienna ms. in order to explain the question in more detail.
 - In paragraph 3, the expression “et per consequens” found in the Vienna ms. is formulated as “ita et”, “so also”, both in Petrus Nigri and in the Hebrew (*hinneh gam*, “likewise”, literally “so also”).
 - In the same paragraph, the discussion concerning knowledge of contingent and corruptible things is not found in the Latin text of the Vienna ms. while it appears both in Petrus Nigri and in the Hebrew, although in different forms and in different places. Petrus Nigri definitely affirms that there can be no scientific knowledge of either of them (“de contingentibus et corruptibilibus non est scientia”), and attributes this statement to Aristotle himself (“ut patet primo *Posteriorum*”); in contrast, ‘Eli Habillo’s translation affirms that “we cannot have scientific knowledge of that which is possible yet not have it of that which is corruptible”, and places this statement before the reference to the *Metaphysics*.

However, there are points where Petrus Nigri’s text and the Hebrew translation differ, for instance:

- In the second sentence of paragraph 3 of the Latin text, as it is found in the Vienna ms., the term “universal” is applied to “nature”; it corresponds exactly to the term *kolel* as found in the Hebrew translation, which is the common technical term for the philosophical concept of “universal”. In contrast, Petrus Nigri employs the term “specific”, which has the opposite meaning, and is obviously a mistake.
- There is an almost perfect correspondence between the phrase found at the beginning of paragraph 3 of the Latin text of the Vienna ms. (“natura universalis, postquam plurificatur et multiplicatur ad multiplicationem eorum”, i.e. of the individuals) and a passage of the Hebrew translation (“given that universal nature is multiplied in keeping with the multiplication of its individuals”). This passage is partially different in Petrus Nigri’s work, where there is a reference to the absence of any “proper unity” in the nature of the universal, which is not present in either the Vienna ms. or the Hebrew text.

- The penultimate passage we have examined above, including the statement that the universal is eternal, does not correspond to anything in Petrus Nigri's work.

Finally, there are some passages in the Hebrew translation which are absent from the Latin text and from Petrus Nigri's citation. Near to the beginning of the Hebrew translation, one reads the following: "It would be impossible for relationships within the nature of that universal to be changeable, since that universal would be real"; this passage has no equivalent in the Vienna ms. or Petrus Nigri. Also the long passage near the end of the Hebrew text ("This, however, is false, since this assertion is not proved there in a universal manner as is done in the first book of the *Posterior Analytics*; in fact, if it were proved, the entire science would be universal. Therefore, that real universal, being possible, would be many, since it would be multiplied into many unities") is totally absent from the Latin tradition.

In this case, one can suppose that a similar argument was found in the lost original Latin text of Vincent Ferrer's work, but was omitted in the text as it is transmitted by the Vienna ms. because of a homeoteleuton, since two sentences began with the same words ("quod est falsum—this, however, is false").

4th Argument

This argument contends that if species were not something real and one, individuals from the same species would be as different from each other as they are from an individual of any other species.

Latin text Ed. Fidora/Zonta, pp. 88/90	Petrus Nigri <i>Clipeus thomistarum</i> , fol. 66 ^{rb-va}
[8] Quarto arguitur: si Sortes et Plato non essent indistincta in aliquo reali, tunc Sortes tantum differret a Platone quantum differt a lapide. Patet quia nihil idem est realiter in Sorte et in Platone, et sic differrent per omne illud quod est in ipsis. Sed Sortes per nihil plus differt a lapide nisi per illud quod est in eo. Ergo tantum differt a Platone quantum a lapide, ex quo per nihil sui identificatur cum Platone sic nec cum lapide.	Secunda ratio. Nisi Sortes et Plato essent indistincta in aliquo uno reali, tunc Sortes tantum differret a Platone quantum a lapide. Patet quia nihil realiter esset in Sorte et in Platone, in quo convenirent, et sic differrent per omne illud quod est in ipsis, sed per nihil plus differt Sortes a lapide nisi per omne illud quod est in ipso. Igitur tantum differt a Platone quantum a lapide. Ex quo per nihil sui identificatur cum Platone, sicut nec cum lapide.

[109] חמישית: אם לא היו סקראט ואפלאטון מתחלפים בדבר מה עניני, הנה יתחייב שסקראט יהיה כל כך מתחלף לאפלאטון כמו שהוא מתחלף לאבן. וזה שלא ימצא דבר מה עניני הוא הוא בסקראט ואפלאטון, ואם כן יהיה מתחלף לו בכל מה שהוא בו. אבל לא יתחלף לאבן, אם לא יהיה בדבר אחד בו כלל הוא הוא עם אפלאטון, כמו שאיננו בדבר בו כלל הוא הוא עם האבן.

Translation: [109] Fifth argument: if Socrates and Plato did not differ in terms of something real, Socrates would differ as much from Plato as he does from a stone. In fact, there exists nothing really identical in Socrates and in Plato; consequently, he would be different in all that is found in him. But Socrates would only differ from a stone if he bore no similarity at all to Plato, just as he bears no similarity at all to a stone.

Here, the Latin text from the Vienna ms. and Petrus Nigri's citation are very similar. The Hebrew translation also seems to suggest nothing new for the textual reconstruction. Yet, it is of interest that the passage "(ni)si Sortes et Plato non essent indistincta" as well as the passage "differrent per omne illud quod est in ipsis", have both been translated into Hebrew in an incorrect and misleading way. In the first case, 'Eli Habillo translates "esse indistincta" as "to differ", i.e. the opposite of what the Latin text is meant to say; in the second case, the plural of the Latin clause is rendered as a singular into Hebrew, and hence the argument loses its correct reference.

5th Argument

This argument contends that the activity of an agent requires that the specific traits by which it constitutes an efficient cause, be real.

Latin text Ed. Fidora/Zonta, p. 90	Petrus Nigri <i>Clipeus thomistarum</i> , fol. 66 ^{va}
[9] Quinto sic: ignis generat ignem ex aere et corrumpit aerem. Sed hoc non est propter unitatem conceptus quam habet ignis cum igne, quia hoc faceret dato quod nullus conceptus esset. Ergo hoc est propter aliquam unitatem realem quae non est universalis, ut constat.	Sexta ratio. Ignis generat ignem et corrumpit aerem, sed hoc non est propter unitatem conceptus quem habet ignis cum igne, quia hoc faceret dato quod nullus conceptus esset. Igitur hoc est propter aliquam unitatem realem quae non est numeralis. Igitur minor unitate numerali.

[110] ששית, כי האש תעז האש ותפסיד האויר, וזה איננו מצד האחדות אשר במושג והלקוח בשכל מהאש, האחת והאחרת, כי, אם זה יהיה כן, לו הונח שלא ימצא מושכל מהאש, אבל הוא מצד אחדות מה עניני אשר איננו מספרי, כמו שנתבאר.

Translation: [110] The sixth argument is [based upon the hypothesis] that fire generates fire and corrupts air, yet does not do so because of both the

unity attaching to the object and that which is received by the intellect from fire. For, if such were the case, one might suppose that nothing has been understood which proceeds from fire, but is understood rather on account of some real unity which is not numerical, as is proved.

In this paragraph, the Hebrew translation shares the same omission and the same variant reading with Petrus Nigri's citation, which do not occur in the Vienna ms. Thus, at the beginning of the paragraph, the Vienna ms. affirms that fire generates fire "ex aere". This statement, which substantially agrees with the contents of Aristotelian physics, might have been in the lost original text, but might also have been added by the copyist of the Vienna ms.; it is absent from Petrus Nigri's citation and there is no correspondence in the Hebrew translation. In turn, at the end of the paragraph, the term "universal", found in the Vienna ms., is replaced by the correct term "numerical" in both Petrus Nigri and the Hebrew translation.

7th Argument

The seventh argument proceeds in the following manner: Leaving the intellect to one side, things which are related possess some real unity that relates them.

Latin text Ed. Fidora/Zonta, p. 92	Petrus Nigri <i>Clipeus thomistarum</i> , fol. 66 ^{va}
[11] Septimo sic: quae sunt comparabilia, seclusa operatione intellectus, habent aliquod unum, seclusa operatione intellectus, in quo comparantur ista. Patet quia comparatio respicit aliquid ad quod comparabilia comparantur. Sed Sortes et Plato sunt comparabiles in humanitate, seclusa operatione intellectus, quia sunt conformes et aequales in humanitate. Ergo, seclusa operatione intellectus, humanitas est una.	Tertia ratio. Quae sunt comparabilia seclusa operatione intellectus, illa habent aliquod unum realiter seclusa operatione intellectus in quo comparerentur, sed Sortes et Plato sunt comparabiles ad invicem seclusa operatione intellectus. Igitur seclusa operatione intellectus aliquid unum erit in ipsis. Maior nota, quia omnis comparatio fundatur supra unitate. Minor probatur, quia seclusa operatione intellectus Sortes est similis in humanitate Platoni et non asino.

[112] שמינית: הדברים אשר הם מתיחסים, מזולת פעל השכל, הם אחד מה, מזולת פעל השכל אשר בו יהיו מתיחסים; וזה כי ההתיחסות יחייב דבר מה אשר בו יוחסו המתיחסים. אבל סקראט ואפלאטון הם מתיחסים באחדות מזולת פעל השכל, כי, אף אם יעדר כל פעל השכל, היו מסכימים או שוים באנושות. אם כן מזולת פעל השכל יהיה בהם אנושות אחד.

Translation: [112] Eighth argument: things which are related, the operations of the intellect notwithstanding, possess a certain unity regardless of the operations of the intellect by which they are related. In fact, the comparison records something by means of which the terms in the relation are compared. But Socrates and Plato are compared in terms of their unity, the operations of the intellect notwithstanding, since, even if all operations of the intellect were lacking, Socrates and Plato would be in agreement or equivalent as regards their humanity, so that their humanity is one, irrespective of the operations of the intellect.

In this passage there is possibly a case of what is called by philologists a “diffraction *in absentia*”,⁹ that is to say, a case where, due to its difficulty, a word or even a longer section of a lost original text was altered in different ways by the various copyists (or translators), so that we can at this juncture only provide a tentative reconstruction of the word or sentence through a detailed philological comparison of the different extant texts. Thus, the terms “in humanitate”, found in the Vienna ms., and “ad invicem”, found in Petrus Nigri’s citation, both referring to Socrates and Plato, might be the result of different erroneous readings of the original Latin term “in unitate”, which was correctly translated into Hebrew as *be-ahadut*, “in terms of (their) unity”. This hypothesis seems to be confirmed by another statement found in Petrus Nigri’s citation, according to which every comparison is based upon the unity (“*omnis comparatio fundatur supra unitate*”).

8th Argument

The eighth argument goes as follows: Unless one accepts the real unity of a species, diversity between species cannot be real.

Latin text Ed. Fidora/Zonta, pp. 92/94	Petrus Nigri <i>Clipeus thomistarum</i> , fol. 66 ^{va}
[12] Octavo sic: tunc diversitas quae est inter hominem et asinum in communi non erit realis, cum ipsa sit communis omnibus individuis contentis sub illis naturis in communi. Sed hoc est falsum, quia tunc esset processus in infinitum.	Quarta ratio. Si unitas inter Sortem et Platonem non est realis, tunc sequeretur quod diversitas, quae est inter hominem et asinum in communi, non erit realis, cum ipsa sit communis omnibus individuis contentis sub illis naturis, scilicet sub homine et asino in communi, sed hoc est falsum.

⁹ About this concept, see D’Arco Silvio Avalle, *Principi di critica testuale* (Padua: Antenore, 1978), 58–59.

Latin text Ed. Fidora/Zonta, pp. 92/94	Petrus Nigri <i>Clipeus thomistarum</i> , fol. 66 ^{va}
[13] Quod probo, quia haec diversitas asini in communi non est una realiter cum diversitate hominis in communi, quia individua eorum realiter non identificantur in natura communi. Ergo, si haec diversitas non est idem realiter cum illa, igitur est diversa. [...]	Consequentia probatur, quia si nihil commune erit reale, sequitur quod cum illa differentia sit communis omnibus individuis, quod etiam non erit realis.

[113] תשיעית: שאם כן היה מתחייב שהזולתיות אשר בין האדם והחמור בכלל לא היה זולתיות עניני, כיהוא משותף לכל האישים אשר תחת השני טבעים ההם, ר"ל האדם והחמור, בכלל; אבל זה שקר, שאם כן יעבור הדבר לבלתי תכלית.

וזה כי זולתיות החמור בכלל אינו אחד בענין עם זולתיות האדם בכלל; וזה כי לפי דעתך האישים לא יהיו דבר אחד והוא הוא בטבע המשותף. אם כן, אם זה הזולתיות איננו אחד והוא הוא בענין עם האחר, אם כן הוא מתחלף. [...]

Translation: [113] Ninth argument: if such were the case, the diversity that exists between man-in-common and donkey-in-common would not be a real diversity, since it is common to all the individuals which belong to these two natures, i.e. man-in-common and donkey-in-common; but this is false, since, if it were true, it would lead to an infinite regress. In fact, the diversity attaching to donkey-in-common is not really identifiable with the diversity attaching to man-in-common, since, in your opinion, individuals are not really one and the same as the nature they hold in common. Thus, if the latter diversity is not really one and is the same as the former, if so, it is different from it. [...]

At first sight the Latin text from the Vienna ms. and the Hebrew translation seem to be almost identical; yet the Hebrew is more in accordance with Petrus Nigri than with the Vienna ms. when adding the explanatory clause “i.e. man-in-common and donkey-in-common” (“scilicet sub homine et asino in communi”). In addition, while leaving aside the idea of an infinite regress, which is present both in the Vienna ms. and in the Hebrew, Petrus Nigri adds another explanatory clause at the very beginning, namely “si unitas inter Sortem et Platonem non est realis” which has a sort of parallel in the Hebrew expression “if such were the case”, but is completely absent from the Vienna ms.

gth Argument

The ninth argument proceeds as follows: The operations of the intellect notwithstanding, everything that is common is really a unitary nature. However, animals crave food-in-common. Ergo, there exists a unitary nature.

Latin text Ed. Fidora/Zonta, pp. 94/96	Petrus Nigri <i>Clipeus thomistarum</i> , fol. 66 ^{va}
[14] Nono sic: omne quod est commune, seclusa operatione animae, est unum, seclusa operatione animae, quia omne commune est unum, sed aliqua natura est communis, seclusa operatione animae.	Quinta ratio. Quod est commune seclusa operatione intellectus, hoc est unum seclusa operatione intellectus. Patet quia omne commune est unum, sed aliqua natura est communis seclusa operatione intellectus, ergo aliqua natura est una seclusa operatione intellectus.
Patet, quia appetitus asini esuriit remota operatione intellectus. Vel igitur appetit istum cibum in particulari vel in communi. Non primum, quia non habet notitiam qualemcumque de hoc cibo vel de illo in particulari. Ergo appetit cibum in communi.	Minor probatur, quia quando asinus appetit cibum, vel ergo appetit cibum istum in particulari vel cibum in communi. Non cibum hunc in particulari, quia non habet cognitionem de hoc cibo particulari quem non videt. Igitur appetit cibum in communi. Igitur aliquis est cibus in communi seclusa operatione intellectus.

[114] עשירית: מה שהוא משותף מזולת פעל השכל הוא אחד מזולת פעל השכל, וזה כי כל משותף הוא אחד; אם כן מה שהוא משותף מזולת פעל השכל הוא אחד מזולת פעל השכל. אבל מה שהוא טבע מה משותף מזולת פעל השכל. וזה כי תאות החמור תהיה בזולת פעל השכל, וזה אם שיתאוו זה המאכל החלקי, או שיתאוו המאכל הכללי. ואינו + ... + תאות זה המאכל החלקי, כי אין לו חכמה בזה המאכל, או באותה. הנה יאוו המאכל בכלל.

Translation: [114] Tenth argument: that which is common, the operations of the intellect notwithstanding, is one, [again] the operations of the intellect notwithstanding, since everything that is common is one; therefore, whatever is common, regardless of the actions of the intellect, is one, regardless of the actions of the intellect. However, a certain nature is common, independently from the operations of the intellect, since the donkey's appetite is [such], separately from the operations of the intellect: the donkey desires either this particular food or food-in-common, and is not †...† crave food in particular, since it has no knowledge of this food or that food [in particular]. Therefore, the donkey craves food-in-common.

The Hebrew translation of this paragraph suggests that the Latin term “esuriit”, “is hungry”, which refers to the appetite of the donkey and is found

in the Vienna ms., is a sort of *lectio difficilior*,¹⁰ which was incorrectly read or easily interpreted by ‘Eli Habillo as “est”, “is”, and was rendered into Hebrew as *tihyeh*, “is”. In general, the Hebrew translation of this passage comes closer to the Latin text of the Vienna ms. than to Petrus Nigri’s text. Yet, it shares some features with Petrus Nigri’s citation, as, for instance, the additional sentence “ergo aliqua natura est una seclusa operatione intellectus”, echoed by the following phrase of the Hebrew text: “therefore, whatever is common, regardless of the actions of the intellect, is one”.

2.2. *Opposing Arguments,*
Aiming to Deny that the Universal’s Unity Is Real

1st Opposing Argument

The cycle of opposing arguments opens with a reference to creation, where-in it is affirmed that nothing could be created *ex nihilo* if universals were to precede that creation.

Latin text Ed. Fidora/Zonta, pp. 98/100	Petrus Nigri <i>Clipeus thomistarum</i> , fol. 67 ^{rb-va}
[18] In oppositum arguitur sic primo, quia si natura universalis esset una realiter, tunc sequeretur quod creatio non esset ex nihilo, quod est contra fidem. Ergo, etc.	Tertio sic.
[19] Patet consequentia. Ponatur quod anima hodie creetur; tunc arguo: illud non fit ex nihilo cuius praecessit aliqua entitas. Sed animae quae hodie creatur praecessit aliqua entitas, quia natura animae in communi, quae est una et eadem similiter cum anima quae hodie est creata, habeat animam in communi quae praecessit creationem. Ergo, etc.	
[20] Si autem dicatur quod creatio fit ex mero nihilo in particulari, non ex mero nihilo in communi, contra hoc arguitur sic. Oportet, si hoc esset verum quod tu dicis, sequeretur tunc unum de duobus inconvenientibus, scilicet, quod vel nihil creatur vel quod anima sit partibilis intrinsece.	Si hoc esset verum, scilicet quod creatio fieret ex mero nihilo particulari, non ex nihilo universalis, tunc sequeretur unum de duobus inconvenientibus, scilicet quod vel nihil crearetur vel quod anima sit partibilis intrinsece, quorum utrumque est falsum.

¹⁰ About this concept, see Avalor, *Principi di critica testuale*, 117–118.

Latin text Ed. Fidora/Zonta, pp. 98/100	Petrus Nigri <i>Clipeus thomistarum</i> , fol. 67 ^{rb-va}
[21] Probo, quia cum Deus creat animam tunc dat et communicat sibi illud esse universale et nihil aliud, aut dat aliud sibi de novo praeter illud esse universale. Si detur primum, sequitur quod nihil creatur, cum tota eius entitas praecedat. Si detur secundum, habeo propositum, scilicet, quod anima erit partibilis intrinsece, scilicet, in illud esse universale et in esse particulare quod sibi est datum de novo.	Sequela probatur, quia quando Deus creat animam, aut dat et communicat sibi illud esse universale et nihil aliud, aut dat sibi aliud esse de novo praeter illud esse universale. Si detur primum, sequitur quod nihil creetur, cum tota entitas quae huic est communicata praecedat. Si detur secundum, sequitur quod anima erit partibilis intrinsece, scilicet in illud esse universale et in illud esse particulare quod sibi est datum de novo. Et sic secundum esse universale erit communis et non communis, particularis et non particularis, quae sunt absurda.

[89] וראשונה אבאר זה על זה הדרך. אם היה הטבע הכולל הוא אחד עניני, הנה יתחייב שלא תהיה הבריאה מההעדר הגמור. אבל זה מנגד האמונה; אם כן וכו'. ההמשכות תבאר. וזה שניח שנפש האדם נבראת היום, ואומר כן: הדבר אשר קדם לו ישות מה, הנה לא נברא מההעדר גמור. אבל הנה קדם ישות מה לישות הנפש אשר נבראת היום; וזה כי קדמה הנפש בכללותה אשר היא דבר אחד בענין והוא הוא עם הנפש אשר נבראת היום, והנה זאת הנפש אשר היא הנפש בכללות קדמה לנפש הנבראת היום; אם כן וכו'. ואם תאמר שהבריאה תהיה מההעדר גמור חלקי, לא מההעדר גמור משותף, הנה אטעון כנגד זה על זה האופן. כי אם זה יהיה אמת, כמו שאתה אומר, הנה יתחייב אחד משני בטולים, אם שלא יהיה דבר נברא כלל, או שתהיה הנפש מתחלקת בעצמה. וזה כי כשברא האל הנפש, הנה אם שהוא נותן ומשתף לה המציאות ההוא הכולל ולא דבר אחר זולתו, או הוא נותן לה מציאות אחר מחדש מזולת המציאות ההוא הכולל. אם תאמר החלק הראשון, יתחייב שלא יהיה דבר נברא כלל, כי היה כל מציאותו קודם לבריאה ההיא. אם תאמר השני, הנה יתחייב שתהיה הנפש מתחלקת בעצמה—ר"ל שתתחלק אל המציאות ההוא הכולל ואל המציאות ההוא החלקי הנתן שם מחדש. ועוד יתחייב שיצדקו שני מתהפכים לדבר אחד, וזה כי נפש האדם שהתיר להבראות הנה היא לא נבארת שותף, ואם כן היא היתה דבר מה בכללי ולא כלום בחלקי. אבל דבר מה ולא כלום התחלפו; אם כן, וכו'.

Translation: [89] The first proof goes as follows. If the universal nature were really one, it would follow therefrom that creation would not be from nothing; but this is against the faith. The consequence of the above-mentioned statement is clear. Let us assume that man's soul has been created today; and I say that what is preceded by an entity is not created from nothing. But the entity of the soul which is created today is preceded by some kind of entity. In fact, the soul-in-common should be preceded by what is really one and is identical to the soul which is created today, and that soul which is such in common should precede the soul which is created today. [Therefore, the soul should be created from nothing.] If you were to say that creation stems from a

nothing-in-particular rather than a nothing-in-common, I can argue against this as follows. If this statement were true, like you say, one of the following two absurdities would be the result: either no thing is created, or the soul is intrinsically divisible. In fact, when God creates the soul, either He gives to it that universal existence and nothing else, or He gives to it another, new existence which is not that universal existence. In the former case, no thing would be created, since all that existence would precede that creation. In the latter case, the soul is intrinsically divisible, i.e., it may be divided into that universal existence as well as into that particular existence which would be given to it anew. But in this case two convertible¹¹ things might be verified of the same thing, since man's soul, which can be created, would not be created in common, and, therefore, would be something in general yet nothing in particular; and 'something' and 'nothing' are convertible.

A comparative analysis of the above three different renderings of this passage shows, once more, that the Latin text of the Vienna ms., Petrus Nigri's citation, and the Hebrew translation follow three different paths in interpreting the same archetype: On the one hand, Petrus Nigri omits several passages which both are in the Vienna ms. and in the Hebrew text; on the other hand, the Vienna ms. skips the very important conclusion of the passage about the impossibility of dividing the human soul, which is found, albeit in different ways, both in Petrus Nigri and in the Hebrew translation. This conclusion states that, if this division were possible, there would be an absurd consequence, since the universal would be common and particular at the same time ("universale erit communis et non communis, particularis et non particularis", as Petrus Nigri writes) and two "convertible" things (i.e. two things which can be converted into their opposites) would be found in the same thing (as the Hebrew translation states). In turn, it seems that 'Eli Habillo completed the phrase "cum tota eius entitas praecedat", as found in the Vienna ms. in the middle of paragraph 21, with the words *la-ber'ah ha-hi*?, "that creation"; this reference to the creation was possibly in the lost original Latin text as "quae huic est creata", and might have been misread by Petrus Nigri (or by his copyist) as "quae huic est communicata".

9th Opposing Argument

This argument claims that if we were to admit that human nature is really one in all men, God could not annihilate a single man because, in doing so, he would annihilate the entire human race.

¹¹ Here and below, the term "convertible" is the correct translation of the Hebrew term *mithappekh*, which is employed in the sense of "turned over, convertible into an opposite thing".

Latin text Ed. Fidora/Zonta, pp. 112 / 114	Petrus Nigri <i>Clipeus thomistarum</i> , fol. 68 ^{ra}
<p>[42] Item, sequeretur quod natura non posset annullare unum individuum quin alia individua annullaret. Patet, tota natura humana salvatur in uno supposito, scilicet, in Petro, aliter non esset homo. Ergo, quando Deus annullabit Petrum, per necessitatem totam naturam humanam annullabit, quae erat in Petro. Sed tota illa natura humana etiam erat in Guilermo et in aliis; igitur, per necessitatem annullabit omnes homines. Et sic Deus non posset praecise annullare unum hominem, quod dicitur esse contra fidem.</p>	<p>Quinto sic. Si sic, sequeretur quod Deus non posset anihilare unum individuum quin anihilaret alia individua; sed hoc est falsum. Igitur, etc. Consequentia patet, quia quaecumque habent eandem essentiam et eandem formalitatem, anihilato uno, anihilabitur et aliud. Sed Petrus et Paulus secundum te habent eandem essentiam et eandem formalitatem, et solum differunt per modos intrinsecos sive haecitates. Igitur, etc. [...]</p>
<p>[43] Si dicatur quod argumentum haberet veritatem si tota natura humana esset in Petro, et pro toto. Sed quia non est ibi pro toto, ideo non quia annullato Petro annullarentur omnes homines; contra, istud non evacuat argumentum propter duo aliqua.</p>	<p>Diceretur forsitan quod argumentum haberet veritatem si tota natura humana esset in Petro tota et pro tota. Sed quia non est in Petro pro tota, ideo non oportet, quod anihilato Petro anihilarentur alii homines. Contra dupliciter.</p>
<p>[44] Primo, quando aliqua sunt idem realiter, essentialiter et convertibiliter, adnihilato uno adnihilatur alterum. Sed natura humana communis existens est idem realiter et essentialiter et etiam convertibiliter in se ipsa, ut existit in Guilermo. Igitur annullata ea ut est in Petro annullabitur ut est in aliis hominibus. Ergo non valet.</p>	<p>Primo quando aliqua sunt idem realiter, essentialiter, formaliter et convertibiliter, anihilato uno anihilatur et reliquum. Sed natura humana existens in Petro est idem essentialiter, formaliter et convertibiliter cum seipsa ut existit in Paulo, quia est eadem ut tu dicis. Igitur, etc.</p>
<p>[45] Propter aliud, quia nihil est pro toto in ista natura humana, vel est de essentia naturae humanae vel est accidens. Si sit de essentia, cum tota essentia salvetur in Petro, ergo etiam salvabitur in Petro pro toto. Si sit accidens eius, cum accidens sequetur suum subiectum secundum Boethium, et tota natura includatur in Petro. Ergo, in Petro includetur pro toto.</p>	<p>Secundo, quia naturam esse in Petro pro tota est de essentia naturae humanae vel est accidens. Si est de essentia naturae humanae, igitur, cum tota essentia naturae humanae salvetur in Petro, salvabitur et ibi pro tota. Si est accidens naturae humanae, vel commune vel proprium. Si commune, igitur oritur ex principiis individuis et non est accidens naturae. Si accidens proprium ipsi naturae, tunc erit ibi ubi est natura, quia</p>

Latin text
Ed. Fidora/Zonta, pp. 112 / 114

Petrus Nigri
Clipeus thomistarum, fol. 68^{ra}

accidens proprium semper sequitur naturam. Sed tota natura est in Petro, igitur et pro tota. Confirmatur, quia ubi est homo, ibi est risibile. Si igitur esse in Petro pro tota est passio naturae humanae, erit et in Petro, etc.

[97] תשיעית: שאם כן הנה יתחייב שלא יוכל האל להפך נמצא אישי מה אל ההעדר הגמור מבלי שיהפך כל האישים אל ההעדר הגמור. וזה כי הוא יעמיד ויתקיים כל הטבע האנושי במונח אחד, ר"ל באיש אחד מהם, כסקראט דרך משל. ואם כן למה שאפשר שיתקיים גם כן באפלאטון ובזולתם מהאנשים, אם כן מן ההכרח הוא שיעדר כל האנשים, ואם כן אי אפשר שיעדר איש מה, למה שזה היה נגד האמונה. ואם שתאמר שזאת הטענה לא תועיל, וזה שהיא אמתית, אם היה הטבע האנושי כלו בסקראט ובעבור הכל, אמנם למה שאיננו כולו ובעבור הכל, הנה לא תועיל כלל, כי אם יעדר סקראט יעדר כל האנשים, אומר שזה לא יסיר כח הטענה לשתי סבות: הא' כי הדברים אשר הם דבר אחד + ... + במציאות עניני ובאופן עצמי ובצד מתהפך במשא, הנה כשיעדר האחד יעדר השני; אבל הטבע האנושי המשותף העומד בסקראט, הנה הוא עצמי במה שהוא באפלאטון במציאות עניני ובאופן עצמי ובצד מתהפך בעצמה; אם כן כשיעדר במה שהוא בסקראט, יעדר בהכרח במה שהוא באפלאטון. הב' כי היות הדבר בעבור הכל, אם שהיה ממהות הטבע האנושי, או הוא מקרה לו. אם הוא עצמי לו, הנה למה שכל המהות האנושי הוא עומד ומתקיים בסקראט, אם כן הוא בו גם כן בעבור הכל. אם הוא מקרה לו, למה שהיה המקרה נמשך לנושא, כמו שאמר בואסיו, והיה הטבע האנושי כלו נכלל בסקראט, הנה יתחייב שיהיה גם כן נכלל בסקראט בעבור הכל. אם כן וכו'.

Translation: [97] Ninth: if this were the case, God would not be able to annihilate a single individual without annihilating all individuals. In fact, he arranges and establishes the entirety of human nature in one supposit, namely, in one such man, e.g. in Socrates. Since that nature may be found in Plato and in other men too, this fact would necessarily annihilate all men, although it could not annihilate a single man, because this would go against the faith. If you say that this argument does not hold true, in that it would be so only if the whole of human nature in its entirety were to reside in Socrates, but that since matters are not thus, it is invalid to say that, if Socrates had been annihilated, all men would be annihilated, I reply to you that this fact does not destroy the force of the argument, for two reasons. First, as regards things which are one †...† really, as well as essentially and in terms of their convertibility, when one of them is annihilated the other is annihilated too; common human nature as found in Socrates, however, is essential insofar as in itself it resides likewise in Plato in real as well as essential and convertible terms, so that, when that human nature is annihilated insofar as it is in Socrates, it should necessarily be annihilated insofar as it is in Plato. Second, the total being of the thing either pertains to the essence of human nature, or is an accident of that nature. If it is essential, then since the entire human

essence is found in Socrates, that essence is also there in its entirety. If it is accidental, then since the accident follows its subject, as Boethius said, and the entire human nature is included in Socrates, it should be included in Socrates in its entirety.

In this opposing argument too, there are some passages where each of the three witnesses includes a mistake or an omission which is not found in the others. For example, in paragraph 42 there is a long passage (from the words “aliter non esset homo ...”, which follow the words “in Petro”, up to the words “... annullabit quae erat in Petro”) which is missing in the Hebrew, due to an evident case of homeoteleuton. In turn, at the beginning of the same paragraph, the Vienna ms. incorrectly ascribes to “nature” the capacity of annihilating a single individual, which Petrus Nigri and ‘Eli Habbilo correctly attribute to God. The apparent alterations of the lost original text, as they are found in Petrus Nigri, are so many that they cannot be pointed out here. Yet, no sure and evident case of a so-called “separative and conjunctive error”,¹² which could prove the dependence of two of the three witnesses upon a common ancestor, different from that employed by the other witness, has been found.

10th Opposing Argument

This argument is based on the following line of thought: If the human nature were really one, the human body would also be really one; thus one and the same body would be in different places at the same time.

Latin text Ed. Fidora/Zonta, pp. 114/116	Petrus Nigri <i>Clipeus thomistarum</i> , fol. 68 ^{ra-b}
[46] Item, tunc unum corpus in diversis locis. Probo quod natura humana est corpus cum sit inferius ad corpus; bene enim dicitur ‘homo est corpus’. Sed homo in communi unus et idem realiter est in Gregorio et Petro; modo Gregorius et Petrus sunt in diversis locis. Ergo homo qui est in eis erit in diversis locis.	Sexto sic. Si sic, sequeretur quod unum corpus esset in diversis locis, sed hoc est impossibile. Igitur, etc. Consequentia probatur quia natura humana est corpus, cum sit inferius ad corpus. Sed homo in communi idem formaliter et essentialiter est in Petro et in Paulo, qui sunt in diversis locis. Igitur unum corpus erit in diversis locis.

¹² About the nature of a “separative and conjunctive error” and its importance for reconstructing the history of a text, see D’Avalle, *Principi di critica testuale*, 44–45.

Latin text

Ed. Fidora/Zonta, pp. 114/116

Petrus Nigri

Clipeus thomistarum, fol. 68^{ra-b}

[47] Si dicatur quod unum corpus numero non potest esse in diversis locis, sed bene unum corpus commune quale est homo; contra, quandocumque aliquid est tanta identitate idem sibi ipsi quanta cum altero, si cum altero sit idem numero et cum se ipso erit idem numero. Sed homo in communi, si eius unitas sit realis, est tanta identitate idem sibi ipsi quanta in Gregorio, ut de se patet, et cum Gregorio est idem numero, igitur sibi ipsi erit idem in numero. Sed concessum est quod homo in communi est in diversis locis. Ergo, idem numero erit in diversis locis. Sed hoc est falsum et contra Philosophum quarto *Physicorum*.

Si dicatur quod unum corpus singulare non potest esse in diversis locis, tamen bene unum corpus commune quale est homo. Contra. Quandocumque aliquid est tanta identitate sibi ipsi idem quanta identitate alteri, si cum altero est idem numero, et cum seipso est idem numero. Sed si identitas hominis in communi est identitas realis, tanta identitate est idem sibi ipsi, quanta identitate est idem cum Guilielmo, ut per se patet. Quia nihil identificatur alteri plus quam sibi. Sed cum Guilielmo est idem in numero, igitur et sibi ipsi erit idem numero. Sed concessum est quod homo in communi est in diversis locis. Ergo idem corpus numero est in diversis locis, quod est contra Philosophum quarto *Physicorum*.

[98] עשירית: אם היה הדבר כן, הנה היה גשם אחד במקומות רבים. וזה כי הטבע האנושי הוא גוף אחד שהוא נכנס תחת הגוף, כי הוא נאמר על יושר 'האדם הוא גוף'. אבל האדם בכלל הוא אחד בענין בסקראט ובאפלאטון; אבל סקראט ואפלאטון הם במקומות מתחלפים. אם כן האדם אשר הוא בהם הוא במקומות מתחלפים. ואם תאמר שגוף אחד במספר אי אפשר שיהיה במקומות מתחלפים. אבל אפשר שיהיה במקומות מתחלפים גוף אחד משותף, הוא אומר כנגד זה: כל דבר שהוא אחד הנה הוא במדרגת האחדות וההוא הוא עצמו כל כך כמו שהוא מדבר אחר, הנה אם הוא עם דבר אחר דבר אחד במספר, הנה הוא עם עצמו גם כן עצם אחד במספר, וזה מבוואר בעצמו. אבל האדם בכלל, אם היה אחדותו עניני, הנה הוא עם עצמו במדרגת האחדות כל כך כמו שהוא עם סקראט, כמו שהוא נגלה בעצמו. והנה הוא אחד במספר עם סקראט, אם כן הוא גם כן עם עצמו דבר אחד במספר. וכבר הונח שהאדם בכלל הוא במקומות מתחלפים. אם כן הדבר האחד במספר הוא במקומות מתחלפים, וזה הפך דעת הפילוסוף בד' מהשמע. אם כן וכו'.

Translation: [98] Tenth: if this were the case, there would be a single body in various places. Human nature, in fact, is a single body subsumed under 'body' [in general], since it is correctly said that 'man is a body'. But man-in-common is really one in Socrates and in Plato, and Socrates and Plato are found in different places, so that the man found in them would be in different places, [which is absurd]. If you say that a body which is numerically one cannot be found in different places, but that a single common body can, he¹³ replies

¹³ The incorrect reading "he" (*hu*) is found in the Hebrew text, but the lost original Latin text had probably the correct reading "I" here.

that all that is one is identical to itself just as it is to another thing, so that if it is numerically one with respect to another thing, it is clearly numerically one in itself. Should this be the case, man-in-common, if his unity were real, would be as identical to himself as he is to Socrates, as is evident. Therefore, he would be numerically identical to Socrates, and with himself as well. But it has been acknowledged that man-in-common is found in different places. As a result, that which is numerically one would be found in different places—and this is contrary to Aristotle's opinion as expressed in the fourth book of the *Physics*.

In this case we find clear similarities between the Latin text of the Vienna ms. and the Hebrew text, as against Petrus Nigri's text. For instance, the two witnesses state that the identity of man-in-common in different individuals is a real identity ("idem realiter"), while Petrus Nigri's citation speaks of formal and essential identity ("idem formaliter et essentialiter").

Even so, it seems that again there is no sign of a textual error which would prove a close and undoubted dependence of two out of the three extant witnesses of Vincent Ferrer's text upon the same source, which should be different from that employed by the other one.

2.3. *Refutation of the Arguments* *Whereby the Universal Might Be Really One*

1st Refutation

Refutation of the 1st Argument, discussed above under 2.1.

Latin text Ed. Fidora/Zonta, pp. 120 / 122	Petrus Nigri <i>Clipeus thomistarum</i> , fol. 68 ^{vb} Ad rationes alterius opinionis respondeo ad primam. Dico quod maior est falsa. Ad probationem cum dicitur quod si plurificaretur natura ad plurificationem individuorum cum de ipsis particularibus non possit esse scientia, eo quod contingentia sunt et corruptibilia, pari ratione et de universali non posset esse scientia.
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Latin text

Ed. Fidora/Zonta, pp. 120 / 122

Petrus Nigri

Clipeus thomistarum, fol. 68^{vb}

[58] Ad primam rationem dicendum quod de particularibus esse scientiam potest intelligi dupliciter, uno modo accipiendo particularia secundum illud quod sunt difformia et disconveniunt et corruptibilia, et accipiendo ea ut sic, de eis scientia non potest esse, quia ut sic accipiuntur ut nulla natura communis potest ab eis abstrahi, nec sic sumendo sunt haec finita nec apud rem nec apud intellectum.

[59] Alio modo possunt sumi ipsa particularia secundum illud praecise in quo sunt conformia et convenientia, non intelligendo corruptionem eorum nec infinitatem, sed solum accipiendo naturam nudam quae est in eis specifica; in qua natura sunt omnimode conformia, sicut omnes homines, secundum quod homines, sunt praecise; et ut sic accipiuntur, potest ab eis abstrahi una ratio communis. Et ut sic omnia particularia cuiuscumque naturae de mundo sunt apud intellectum finita cum intelligantur ut unum. Et sic sumendo particularia de ipsis potest esse scientia. Unde dico quod de corruptibilibus potest esse scientia, non tamen considerando ea ut sunt corruptibilia sed solum secundum naturam in qua conformia sunt.

[...]

Respondeo dupliciter. Primo quod de particularibus esse scientiam potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo accipiendo particularia secundum illud, secundum quod sint particularisata, individuata, contingentia et infinita, et secundum quod sunt difformia et disconvenientia, et ut sic de eis non est scientia, quia ut sic accipiuntur nulla ratio communis ab eis potest abstrahi, nec sic sumendo sunt finita.

Alio modo possunt considerari ipsa particularia secundum illud praecise in quo sunt conformia et convenientia, non concipiendo corruptionem eorum nec contingentiam nec infinitatem, sed solum considerando ipsam naturam in omnibus sub quadam conformitate existentem, ut considerando omnes homines mundi ut homines sunt, et ut sic concipiuntur potest ab eis abstrahi una ratio communis, et sic omnia particularia cuiuscumque naturae sunt apud intellectum finita, cum intelligantur ut unum, et sic intelligendo particularia de eis potest esse scientia, unde dico quod de corruptibilibus potest esse scientia non ut difformia sunt, sed ut conformia et ut sic incorruptibilia sunt.

[119] אל הראשונה אומר כי אמרו 'אם היה הטבע הכולל' וכו'—זה שקר. ומה שנאמר בביאורו—שאם יתרבה בהתרבות אישיו, ישכיל מה שלא תהיה ידיעה בחלקיים, כי הם אפשריים והם נפסדים ובעלי תכלית; הנה ג"כ מצד הטענה ההיא בעצמה לא תהיה ידיעה בכולל—אשיב שהנחת ידיעת החלקיים תכוון על ב' פנים: הא' כשנקח החלקיים האפשריים מהם אשר הם הבלתי מסכימים ומצד מה שהם נפסדים. ועל זה הצד אי אפשר שתהיה בהם ידיעה, כי על זה הצד אי אפשר שתבא מהמציאות המשותף; הנה על זה הצד אינם בעלי תכלית, לא במציאות ולא בשכל. הב' כשנקח החלקיים ההם מצד ההוא לבד אשר הם בו מסכימים מבלי + ... + התחלפויותם ולא הפסדותם ולא העדר תכליתם, אבל הסכמה אשר ערום אשר סבת ההם אשר בו הם מסכימים לגמרי. והנה כשילקחו על זה האופן, הנה אפשר שתהיה לנו ידיעה בהם, כי אפשר שתניע לנו מהם לקוחים על זה האופן במה משותף

בשכלנו. ועל זה האופן יהיו כל האישים מצד שתהיה בעל תכלית, אבל השכיל כי הם יושכלו במדרגת דבר אחד. ולזה אומר שאפשר שתהיה לנו ידיעה בנפסדים, לא כל שכן נטיתם מצד מה שהם נפסדים, אבל מצד הטבע לבד אשר הם בו מסכימים. [...]

Translation: [119] To the first argument, I reply that its statement ‘if the universal nature’, etc. is false; and to what is said in explanation of this statement—i.e., if [the universal nature] is multiplied when its individuals are multiplied, it is clear that there can be no (scientific) knowledge of particulars, since they are possible, corruptible and determinate, so that, when considered from this point of view, there can be no (scientific) knowledge concerning the universal—I reply that the knowledge we may have of particulars may be understood in two ways. It may be understood, first of all, as grasping the possible particulars insofar as they are discordant and corruptible; and in this sense there cannot be any knowledge of particulars, since that knowledge is unable to be born of common existence; particulars, therefore, are not determinate, either as regards existence or the intellect. Secondly, it can be taken to mean grasping the particulars strictly in terms of what makes them similar, [while ignoring] †...† their differences, their corruptibility and their lack of definition, and in terms of their overt conformity, which is the reason behind their complete correspondence. When they are considered thus, then may we have (scientific) knowledge of them, since we may have such knowledge when they are considered thus, according to what is common in our intellect. All individuals are such insofar as they are well defined, but he understands that¹⁴ they are understood as if they are one thing. Therefore, I say that we may have some knowledge of corruptible things, not so much in terms of their tendency towards corruptibility, but simply in terms of the nature to which they bear resemblance. [...]¹⁵

¹⁴ Here, the incorrect phrase “he understands that” (*hiskil ki*), found in the Hebrew text, is probably the result of a double reading of the same word. ‘Eli Habillo might have read the Latin term “intelligentur”, “they are understood”, found in both the Vienna ms. and Petrus Nigri, first as “intelligit”, “he understands”, and then in the way in which it actually appears.

¹⁵ Jean-Pierre Rothschild, in his review of our edition (*Revue des études juives* 170 [2011]: 344–346), suggests to correct this passage in some points of the Hebrew text. According to his suggestions, the passage would be as follows: “To the first argument, I reply that its statement ‘if the universal nature’, etc. is false; and to what is said in explanation of this statement—i.e., if [the universal nature] is multiplied when its individuals are multiplied, because there can be no (scientific) knowledge of particulars, since they are possible, corruptible and indeterminate, so that, when considered from this point of view, there can be no (scientific) knowledge concerning the universal—I reply that the knowledge we may have of particulars may be understood in two ways. It may be understood, first of all, as grasping the possible particulars and the indeterminate things insofar as they are discordant and corruptible; and in this sense there cannot be any knowledge of particulars, since that knowledge is unable to be born of common existence; particulars, therefore, are not determinate, either as regards existence or the intellect. Secondly, it can be taken to mean grasping the particulars strictly in terms of what makes them similar, while ignoring their differences, their corruptibility and their lack of definition, and in terms of the human nature, which is found in them (and?) of their overt conformity, which is the reason behind their complete correspondence. When

Here too, as in the 1st Argument,¹⁶ the Hebrew translation and Petrus Nigri's citation agree in discussing a passage which is missing in the Latin text of the Vienna ms. Thus, the first part of Vincent Ferrer's reply to this argument seems to have been almost totally omitted in the Vienna ms., but is found, in almost identical terms, both in Petrus Nigri's citation ("Dico quod maior est falsa. Ad probationem cum dicitur quod si plurificaretur natura ad plurificationem individuorum cum de ipsis particularibus non possit esse scientia, eo quod contingentia sunt et corruptibilia, pari ratione et de universali non posset esse scientia") and in the Hebrew translation ("I reply that its statement 'if the universal nature', etc. is false; and to what is said in explanation of this statement—i.e., if it is multiplied when its individuals are multiplied, it is clear that there can be no scientific knowledge of particulars, since they are possible, corruptible and determinate, so that, when considered from this point of view, there can be no scientific knowledge concerning the universal"). Probably, this omission is due to a choice made by the author of the Latin reworking of Vincent Ferrer's original text: as happens in other cases, he seems to omit a detailed logical analysis of the arguments for the sake of brevity.

Yet, the details of the Refutation of the 1st Argument, as found in the Vienna ms., seem to agree with those found in the Hebrew translation more than with those found in Petrus Nigri's citation. For example, the reference to "disconveniunt et corruptibilia" found in paragraph 58 of the Vienna ms. is identical to that found in the Hebrew translation (the Hebrew expression *ha-bilti maskimim ... u- ... mah she-hem nifsadim* literally means "the discordant things and the corruptible ones"), whereas Petrus Nigri apparently altered and enlarged this reference, since he speaks about "particularisata, individuata, contingentia, infinita, difformia et disconvenientia". At the end of paragraph 58, the phrase "nec apud rem nec apud intellectum",

they are considered thus, then may we have (scientific) knowledge of them, since we may have such knowledge when they are considered thus, a thing (?) that is common in our intellect. All indeterminate individuals are such in a determinate existence, but he understands that they are understood as if they are one thing. Therefore, I say that we may have some knowledge of corruptible things, not when we regard them in terms of their tendency towards corruptibility, but simply because of the nature to which they bear resemblance." Unfortunately, there is no clear proof of these suggested corrections either in the restored manuscript, or in the microfilmed copy of it, as preserved in Parma, Biblioteca Palatina, microfilm n. 126. Rothschild bases his corrections upon another microfilmed copy of the manuscript, which is in Paris, Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire des Textes (personal communication via e-mail, December 4th, 2011; the copy is numbered "MF 32397" on the Internet site of the IRHT: medium.irht.cnrs.fr/Manuscrits/requete); we hope to examine it in the near future.

¹⁶ See here above, p. 108.

found in the Latin text of the Vienna ms., is identical to that found in the Hebrew translation (“either as regards existence or the intellect”), but is totally absent from Petrus Nigri’s citation. Finally, the whole text of paragraph 59 of the Latin text of the Vienna ms. is substantially similar to the contents of the Hebrew translation, while it differs from the contents of Petrus Nigri’s citation on many points.

4th Refutation

Refutation of the 4th Argument, discussed above under 2.1.

Latin text Ed. Fidora/Zonta, pp. 128/130.	Petrus Nigri <i>Clipeus thomistarum</i> , fol. 68 ^{vb}
[68] Ad quartam rationem dicendum quod duplex est diversitas.	Ad secundam, cum dicitur sequeretur quod Sortes tantum differet a Platone quantum a lapide, dico quod duplex est diversitas.
Quaedam excludens omnem entitatem illius ad quod dicitur distinctum; et sic tantum differunt Sortes et Plato quantum Sortes et lapis, quia sicut Sortes nullam entitatem habet, quae sit eadem realiter cum lapide, sic nullam entitatem habet, quae sit realiter eadem cum Platone.	Quaedam est diversitas excludens maiorem entitatem realem illius a quo tale est diversum, et sic dico quod tantum differt Sortes a Platone quantum a lapide.
[69] Alia est diversitas excludens uniformitatem et identitatem specificam illius a quo dicitur distinctum; et sic non tantum differunt Sortes et Plato quantum Sortes et lapis, quia diversitas quae est inter Sortem et lapidem excludit conformitatem specificam, quae non fuit diversitas quae est inter Sortem et Platonem. Ideo non valet.	Alia est diversitas excludens conformitatem specificam et identitatem specificam illius a quo sic dicitur esse diversum et sic non tantum different Sortes et Plato quantum Sortes et lapis, quia diversitas quae est inter Sortem et lapidem excludit conformitatem specificam, quod non facit diversitas quae est inter Sortem et Platonem.

[123] אל החמישית אומר שמה שנאמר ש'אם בן היה סקראט מתחלף כל כך לאפלאטון כהתחלפות לאבן—אומר שההתחלפות הוא על שני פנים. הא' שיוציא מציאות הדבר הוא אשר יתחלף ממנו, ועל זה הצד היה סקראט מתחלף כל כך לאפלאטון כהתחלפו לאבן, כי כמו שלא ימצא לסקראט מציאות כלל שיהיה הוא הוא בענין עם האבן, כן אין לו דבר שיהיה הוא הוא בענין עם אפלאטון. הב' הוא שיוציא ההסכמה המינית אשר לדבר שהוא מתחלף ממנו, ועל זה הצד לא יתחלפו סקראט ואפלאטון כל כך כמו שיתחלפו סקראט והאבן, כי הזולתיות אשר בין סקראט והאבן יוציא ההסכמה המינית אשר לא יעשה כן הזולתיות אשר הוא בין סקראט ואפלאטון. ולזה לא תועיל הטענה.

Translation: [123] To the fifth argument, I reply as follows. As regards the statement that 'thus, there exists the same difference between Socrates and Plato as there does between Socrates and a stone', I say that the difference is twofold. In the first of these, it precludes the existence of that which differs from it; in this way, Socrates would be as different from Plato as he is from a stone, for just as that which Socrates really shares with a stone has no existence, so also that which he really shares with Plato possesses none either. In the second, it excludes any correspondence as regards species with that from which it differs; thus, there would not be as great a difference between Socrates and Plato as there is between Socrates and a stone, since the difference existing between Socrates and a stone precludes conformity between their species, and the difference between Socrates and Plato is not of this sort. The argument, therefore, is invalid.

As in the previous case, there is a part of the argument where Petrus Nigri's citation and the Hebrew translation agree against the Latin text of the Vienna ms., and another passage where the Vienna ms. and the Hebrew agree against Petrus Nigri. Thus, both Petrus Nigri's citation and the Hebrew translation give the example of the difference between Socrates, Plato and a stone, which is found at the beginning of paragraph 68, while it is omitted by the Vienna ms.; in turn, the detailed examination of this example, as found in the following lines of the Vienna ms., is abbreviated and altered by Petrus Nigri, whereas it is translated rather faithfully into Hebrew.

5th Refutation

Refutation of the 5th Argument, discussed above under 2.1.

Latin text Ed. Fidora/Zonta, p. 130	Petrus Nigri <i>Clipeus thomistarum</i> , fol. 69 ^{ra}
[70] Ad quintam rationem dico quod falsum est quod hoc sit per unitatem realem; immo hoc est propter conformitatem in esse specifico, quam non habet cum aere, et etiam propter ordinem universi, quia unumquodque quantum potest conservat se in esse specifico, nam ad hoc data est nobis virtus generativa secundum Philosophum. Idem ideo non valet.	Ad sextum, cum dicitur ignis generat ignem, concedatur maior. Cum dicitur in minori quod hoc non est propter unitatem conceptus concedo. Quando infertur igitur est propter unitatem realem, dico quod falsum est, sed hoc est propter unitatem conformitatis realis, quae non est una in utroque formaliter, sed in uno formaliter et in alio terminative, et hoc etiam est propter ordinem universi, quia unumquodque quantum potest tamen conservat se in esse.

[124] אל השישית אומר: הנה מה שנאמר ש'האש תהוה אש' וכו'—אודה; ומה שנאמר ש'אין סבת זה אחדות המושכל המושג מהם בשכל'—אודה; ומה שנאמר 'אם כן זה מצד אחדות עניני'—אומר שהוא שקר, אבל הוא מצד ההסכמה במציאות המיני, אשר אין לה, כמו זאת ההסכמה עם האויר, מצד סדור המציאות בכללות, כי כל דבר ישמור עצמו במציאותו המיני כל מה שאפשר לו, ולזה הושם בנו הכח המוליד, לפי מה שכתב ארסטו בג' מספר הנפש, וזה לא תועיל הטענה.

Translation: [124] To the sixth argument, I reply as follows. As regards the statement that 'fire generates fire', etc., I concede it; and I also concede the statement that 'this is not because of the unity of the intellected thing which is conceptualised from them in the intellect'.¹⁷ But as for the statement that 'this can come about by means of a real unity', I reply that this is false, since it occurs rather by virtue of a conformity with specific existence, which fire does not possess, just like the conformity it fails to share with air, [as well as] by virtue of the harmony that prevails in the universe, since everything retains its specific existence, inasmuch as it can, and for this reason has the generative power been granted to us, as it has been recorded by Aristotle in the third book of *On the Soul*. The argument, therefore, is invalid.

The first lines of the Latin text as found in Petrus Nigri's citation, including the detailed criticism of the logical argumentation of the 6th Argument ("cum dicitur ignis generat ignem, concedatur maior. Cum dicitur in minori quod hoc non est propter unitatem conceptus concedo"), were apparently ignored by the copyist of the Vienna ms., while they were incorrectly rendered into Hebrew by 'Eli Habillo ("As regards the statement that 'fire generates fire', etc., I concede it; and I also concede the statement that 'this is not because of the unity of the intellected thing which is conceptualised from them in the intellect'"). In another place, however, the Vienna ms. and the Hebrew translation agree against what is found in Petrus Nigri's citation: The expression "propter conformitatem in esse specifico", found in the Vienna ms., corresponds perfectly to the Hebrew expression *mitsad ha-haskamah ba-mets'ut ha-mini*, "by virtue of a conformity with specific existence"; in contrast, it seems to have been erroneously read and altered by Petrus Nigri, as follows: "propter unitatem conformitatis realis". Finally, there is evidence here that the Hebrew translation transmits the original Latin text in a better way than both the Vienna ms. and Petrus Nigri's citations. The vague reference to Aristotle found at the end of the Vienna ms. ("secundum Philosophum"), which seems to have been ignored

¹⁷ This passage appears to be corrupt in the Hebrew translation. The correct translation of it, according to the general sense of the text, as it emerges from the 6th Argument, should be as follows: "It does not do so because of the unity these concepts have in our intellect."

by Petrus Nigri, is more precisely described in the Hebrew translation as a reference to the third book of the *De anima*.¹⁸

7th Refutation

Refutation of the 7th Argument, discussed above under 2.1.

Latin text Ed. Fidora/Zonta, p. 132	Petrus Nigri <i>Clipeus thomistarum</i> , fol. 68 ^{vb} –69 ^{ra}
<p>[73] Ad septimam rationem dico quod li unum potest mihi dicere vel extremum comparationis vel potest mihi dicere aliquod unum in quo comparantur et conformantur. Si autem dicat extremum comparationis, sic vera est maior et sub isto sensu currit A. Si autem dicat mihi aliquod tertium in quo comparantur, quod sit ab eis acceptum sicut est natura universalis, sic est falsum, et sub isto sensu procedit minor. Et sic argumentum non valet.</p>	<p>A tertiam, dicitur quando dicitur quae sunt comparabilia et caetera quod li unum potest determinare extrema comparationis, et sic maior est vera, et sub eodem sensu currit minor. Vel potest determinare aliquod tertium ab extremis, in quo extrema comparantur, sicut imaginatur ista opinio de natura universalis, et sic est falsum et sub isto sensu currit maior et est falsa. Alio modo dicendum quod ad hoc quod aliquam sint comparabilia seclusa operatione intellectus sufficit unitas conformitatis de qua in sequenti quaestione tractabitur.</p>

[126] אל השמינית אומר כי מה שנאמר ש'הדברים המתיחסים' וכו'—הנה תיבת 'האחד ההוא' אפשר שתורה על קצה ההתיחסות, או על דבר מה שלישי אשר הם מתיחסים בו. אם תורה על קצה ההתיחסות, הנה הגדולה אומרת עם הקטנה על זה המובן, אמנם אם תורה על מה שלישי לקוח מצד אשר בו הם מתיחסים, הנה הוא הטבע הכולל, ועל זה המובן זאת הגדולה כזובת; ועל זה המובן ימות הגדולה. ולזה לא תועיל הטענה.

Translation: [126] To the eighth argument, I reply as follows. As regards the statement that 'things which are related', etc., the words 'that unity' can mean either the extreme terms of that relationship, or some third thing to which they are related. In the former case, the major premiss as well as the minor one are, in this sense, acceptable. In the latter case, it is the universal nature [which is meant], and in this sense the major premiss [i.e. that of the eighth argument] is false, and fails to hold. The argument, therefore, is invalid.

The phrase "quando dicitur quae sunt comparabilia et caetera", as it is quoted by Petrus Nigri at the beginning of paragraph 73, has a substantial

¹⁸ See Aristotle, *De anima*, 432^b23–25, where the Greek philosopher states that "animals can reproduce their species".

correspondence in the Hebrew text (“As regards the statement that ‘things which are related’, etc.”), but is absent from the Vienna ms., whose copyist probably omitted it. The same happens in the case of the reference to the proposition “A”, as found in the Vienna ms.: both in Petrus Nigri’s citation and in the Hebrew translation, this reference is correctly replaced by an explicit reference to the minor premiss of the syllogism. However, the general structure of the argument, as found in the Hebrew text, appears to be more similar to that found in the Vienna ms. than to that found in Petrus Nigri’s passage. This fact seems to confirm the hypothesis that Petrus Nigri occasionally adapted the original Latin text by Vincent Ferrer, just as the copyist of the Vienna ms. did.

8th Refutation

Refutation of the 8th Argument, discussed above under 2.1.

Latin text Ed. Fidora/Zonta, p. 132	Petrus Nigri <i>Clipeus thomistarum</i> , fol. 69 ^{ra}
[74] Ad octavam rationem dicendum: concedetur prima consequentia, et cum dicitur quod hoc est falsum, negatur. Cum dicitur quod illae duae diversitates distinguerentur per alias duas, dico quod se ipsis distinguuntur.	Ad quartam, negatur consequentia quia non valet: unitas hominis et asini non est realis, igitur nec diversitas, quia diversitas eorum est realis, sed unitas est rationis.

[127] אל התשיעי אומר: מה שנאמר 'חלוף' וכו'—אודה; ומה שנאמר ש'הוא שקר'—אומר שהוא אמת על המין; ומה שנאמר ש'אלה המינים מהזולתיות יתחלפו כמיני הזולתיות אשר' וכו'—אומר שאלה מיני הזולתיות הם מתחלפים במיניהם ולא במיני זולתיות אחרים.

Translation: [127] To the ninth argument, I reply as follows. As regards the statement that ‘the diversity’, etc., it is conceded; as regards the statement that ‘this is false’, I say that it is true as far as species is concerned; as regards the statement that ‘such kinds of diversity differ in the same way as do the kinds of diversity which’, etc., I say that such kinds of diversity differ in terms of their species rather than in terms of other kinds of diversity.

Like what happened previously,¹⁹ there is a sort of “diffraction *in absentia*” here. All three texts derive from the same lost archetype, which they altered, abbreviated, or, in the case of ‘Eli Habillo, rendered into a different language, so that the contents of the original text can be reconstructed only by

¹⁹ See above, p. 112, concerning the 7th Argument.

comparing these passages to each other. Probably, in this case the copyist of the Vienna ms. simply abbreviated the original Latin text, and Petrus Nigri, having dropped the idea of infinite regress in the 8th Argument, gave his own solution to the problem, while Habillo tried to translate it into his own language as faithful as possible.

9th Refutation

Refutation of the 9th Argument, discussed above under 2.1.

Latin text Ed. Fidora/Zonta, p. 134	Petrus Nigri <i>Clipeus thomistarum</i> , fol. 69 ^{ra}
[75] Ad nonam rationem dico quod universale potest accipi dupliciter.	Ad quintum, dicendum quod aliquid potest dici commune dupliciter.
Uno modo pro natura absolute sumpta et absolute considerata, et sic non oportet quod sit una, seclusa operatione intellectus; immo potest esse plura realiter et commune realiter et unum realiter; et super tale commune potest fieri quaecumque potentia etiam alia ab intellectu. Et sub isto sensu maior est falsa et minor est vera.	Uno modo secundum abstractionem ut homo in quantum abstrahitur a Sorte et Platone.
[76] Secundo modo potest accipi pro natura ipsa ut est accepta et abstracta a singularibus et in qua ipsa similiter conformantur. Sic forte maior est vera et minor falsa. Et super tale commune nulla potentia fertur nisi potentia intellectiva.	Alio modo quod est commune per disjunctionem ut indifferentiam, id est quod sit hoc vel illud. [...]

[128] אל העשירית: מה שנאמר ש'הוא משותף' וכו', אומר שהמשותף אפשר שילקח על שני פנים. הא' על הטבע הלקוח בהחלט, כטבע האנושי וזולתו. הב' על הטבע שהוא במה שהוא לקוח מופשט מהאישים אשר הם מסכימים בטבע ההוא. אם ילקח באופן הא', יאות לה שיהיה אחד, מזולת פעל השכל, אבל אפשר שיהיה רבים בענין מזולת פעל השכל ומשותף בענין, ובכמו זה המשותף ובערך אליו אפשר שהנחת כח אחר זולת כח השכל; ועל זה המובן הנה הגדולה כוזבת והקטנה צודקת. אמנם אם ילקח המשותף באופן הב', הנה הגדולה וגם הקטנה כוזבת, ובכמו זה המשותף ובערך אליו לא יסודר פעל כח מה, אם לא כח השכל—ולזה לא תועיל הקטנה.

Translation: [128] To the tenth argument, I reply as follows. As regards the statement that what 'is common', etc., I say that what is common may be understood in two ways: first, when considered as a nature in absolute terms,

such as human nature and so on; second, [it can be conceived] just like nature insofar as it is derived by abstraction from its individuals which are in conformity with that nature. In the first case, it is necessary for it to constitute a unity that is independent from the workings of the intellect. However, it may also really be multiple, independently from the workings of the intellect, as well as authentically common. Now, we are referring here to something common upon which other faculties besides that of the intellect may be focused, and in this sense the major premiss is false and the minor one is true. In the second case, both the major premiss and the minor one are false, for we are referring to something common towards which the operations of no faculty other than the intellective are directed. Thus, the minor premiss is invalid.

A comparison between the Latin text as found in the Vienna ms. and the Hebrew translation shows that they substantially agree against Petrus Nigri's citation, where the original text of this passage appears to have been strongly altered and abbreviated. However, the reference to the concept of "universal", as found at the beginning of this refutation in the Vienna ms., is clearly erroneous; the correct term, here, should be "common", as one can see from the beginning of the 9th Argument, as found in paragraph 14 of the Latin text of the Vienna ms.²⁰ This correct term appears both in Petrus Nigri's citation (which refers to the concept of "commune") and in the Hebrew translation (where the corresponding Hebrew term *meshuttaf*, "common", is found).

3. CONCLUSION

The Latin text of the Vienna ms. clearly represents a reworking of the lost original text, whereas Petrus Nigri's citations and the Hebrew translation preserve the original redaction (or parts of it).

Yet, it can not be stated that the Hebrew text and Petrus Nigri's citations form a homogeneous group, opposed to the Vienna ms. Rather, the complete textual comparison of the three witnesses of Vincent Ferrer's treatise, both in their general structure and in their philological details, proves that they are substantially independent from each other.

Furthermore, our comparison suggests that 'Eli Habillo, even though his translation sometimes goes astray, had at his disposal a better Latin text than that of the Vienna ms. In particular, the references to Aristotle's works seem to be more accurate in the Hebrew translation than in the Vienna ms. (cf. 1st Argument and 5th Refutation), thereby allowing us to improve our

²⁰ See above, p. 114.

understanding of the Latin text. In the same sense, Petrus Nigri's citations, notwithstanding the obvious alterations they have been subjected to, prove to be very useful for a tentative reconstruction and interpretation of the original text.

As we have tried to show, Vincent Ferrer's treatise not only offers a well-argued solution to one of the central problems in the history of Graeco-Latin philosophy that attracted the interest of both Christian and Jewish scholars, but also a highly interesting example of multilingual textual transmission and of the importance of this phenomenon for the modern editing and interpreting of medieval texts.²¹

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